What Mullah Omar’s Death Means

30 07 2015

Taliban Mullah Omar Afghan Flag

This week the news media buzzed about the Afghan government’s announcement that the Taliban’s long time leader Mullah Omar died from illness. In fact, some sources claim that he had died in 2013. There are conflicting reports about whether he died in Afghanistan or in a hospital in Karachi, Pakistan. Of course, Pakistan is denying the latter version. If true, then that would be yet another huge embarrassment for Pakistan, following the discovery of Osama bin Laden in Abbottabad and the U.S. targeted assassination of the Al Qaeda leader. The timing of announcing Mullah Omar’s death, and the internal wrangling among senior Taliban leaders that followed the announcement, are all very telling.

First, it begs the question: Is this a major intelligence failure? Or, have world powers including the U.S. been aware of Mullah Omar’s demise in 2013? If so, then why keep it a secret for so long? Second, why should Pakistan’s denials be taken at face value, given the bin Laden legacy? Third, who leaked this news about his death? Fourth, no doubt the source of the leak is aware of the fragility of the current Afghan-Taliban peace talks taking place. Does that mean the leak is intended to derail the so-called peace talks? Fifth, Mullah Omar’s successor, Mullah Akhtar Mansour, a close confidant to Mullah Omar, is also very close to the Haqqani Network, which the U.S. considers a dangerous terrorist organization, and frequently targets its leadership with drone strikes. In fact, Siraj Haqqani has been appointed as Mullah Mansour’s deputy, which is a major chess move.

The situation in the Af-Pak region is extremely complicated, and it’s only getting worse with the changing dynamics and configurations involving a mindboggling number of militias, warlords, religious extremists and militants, drug traffickers, criminal elements, and corrupt officials. And now thrown into the mix we have, supposedly, an ISIS cell opening shop there too. Hence, what we see on the surface is much more complex underneath. Mullah Omar’s death and the belated announcement is not only the tip of the iceberg; it’s a symptom of the massive and violent glaciers and fault-lines that lie underneath, ready to explode or implode at any moment.

Consider the internal dynamics of the Afghan Taliban. According to the BBC News, Mullah Mansour’s appointment as the new Taliban leader did not come from consensus, which means that the Taliban are very divided. A Taliban faction prefers Mullah Omar’s son, Yaqub, to take his father’s mantle. Sounds familiar, no? That echoes the split between Sunnis and Shias that happened some 1400 years ago. The patterns and trends that drive schisms within Islamic extremist groups never grow old.

Mullah Mansour favors the peace talks with the Afghan government. Not all Taliban members agree with this move. And, interestingly, unlike Mullah Omar who held the title “Emir al-Mu’mineen” (“Commander of the Faithful,” a very important appellation in Islamic history), Mullah Mansour is called the “Supreme Leader.” To make matters more confusing, Iran’s Ayatollah Khamene’i bears the title Supreme Leader, and the head of ISIS, Abu Bakr al-Baghdadi calls himself Emir al-Mu’mineen.

Competition among Islamic militant/terrorist groups is fierce, clearly both between and within them. However, while this configuration might seem ideal for the divide-and-conquer strategy that many governments employ, we should not be fooled to think, for a moment, that this is the end of the Taliban. They will regroup, they might have break-off factions appear here and there, but in general the Taliban are not going anywhere in the Af-Pak region. If anything, the fact that the Afghan government is engaging in peace talks with the Taliban indicates that they are a force and entity to contend with, warts and all.

Oh, and one more thing about Mullah Mansour, during the Taliban reign in the mid-1990s, he was actively serving as a minister in the Taliban government, and, according to BBC News, “he had an active role in drug trafficking” (“Mullah Omar: Taliban choose deputy Mansour as successor ,”BBC News, July 30, 2015).

In light of this, consider the following passage excerpted from the Special Inspector General for Afghanistan Reconstruction (SIGAR) April 30, 2015 Quarterly Report (page 46):

“The U.S. government has spent over $8 billion since 2001 on a diverse set of counternarcotics initiatives aimed at reducing the amount of opium poppy that is grown in Afghanistan; reducing the assistance insurgent forces receive from the proceeds of opium trafficking; and reducing the consumption and export of opium products. Counternarcotics initiatives include eradicating opium poppies in farmers’ fields; seizing and destroying harvested opium and refined heroin; arresting and prosecuting drug traffickers; providing alternative crops and income sources to the people who rely on poppy cultivation for their livelihood; campaigning to reduce local demand for opium; and building Afghan capacity to reduce poppy cultivation with less international assistance. However, these efforts have not achieved the overarching objective of reducing the supply of opium in Afghanistan. In fact, opium poppy cultivation has risen dramatically from 8,000 hectares in 2001 to 224,000 hectares in 2014.”

The playing field for the variety of militants and warlords in the Af-Pak region has only expanded in recent years. The Taliban recognize their competition – both internal and external – yet they remain active in carrying out violent attacks in both Afghanistan and Pakistan. Also, Mullah Mansour is shrewdly allied with the Haqqani network, which could be highly beneficial for both.

Plus, Afghanistan and the U.S. and ISAF/NATO allies have numerous Achilles heels when it comes to their efforts in Afghanistan. For example, on the Afghan National Security Forces (ANSF) side, the picture is far from rosy. The SIGAR report (pages 3-4) tells a troubling set of facts:

“SIGAR has issued two audit reports that highlight the challenges the United States faces in gathering reliable information about the total size of the ANSF, reported as of February 20, 2015, to number 328,805 personnel. A new SIGAR audit of the Afghan National Army’s (ANA) personnel and payroll data, as well as one released in January of the Afghan National Police’s (ANP) personnel and payroll data, found no assurance that these data are accurate.

Without reliable data on ANSF strength, the United States cannot determine whether the billions it has spent on recruiting, training, equipping, and sustaining the ANSF since fiscal year (FY) 2002 has been spent properly, or accurately calculate what additional funding may be needed.

… Numbers provide a basis for budgeting and planning—including planning the pace of U.S. and other Coalition forces’ drawdown from Afghanistan.

SIGAR’s audit of ANA personnel data illustrates the cause for concern. A team of SIGAR auditors made unannounced visits to the headquarters of the Afghan National Army’s 207th Corps in Herat Province and the 209th Corps in Balkh Province, and the Afghan Air Force (AAF) air wing based in Kabul. The auditors collected information on 134 service personnel present for duty. Of these, the identities of only 103 could be verified against ANA personnel data. One in nine had no ANA identification card. Of 35 persons present at Balkh, only 23 had an ANA ID card, and five were not listed in the ANSF human-resources database.”

There is much hope and support pinned on Afghan President Ashraf Ghani to turn the security situation around, which would allow U.S. and Coalition troops to draw down significantly. In that spirit, President Ghani has conveyed a message to the Taliban. He is quoted as saying, “The Taliban need to choose not to be al Qaeda, and be Afghan.” For now, Mullah Omar’s death announcement has thrown a wrench into that process, while countless other ominous militant groups wait in the wings. Don’t hold your breath.

Hayat Alvi, Ph.D., is an Associate Professor in National Security Affairs.

The views expressed are personal.

Understanding Afghanistan

8 01 2012

There’s a circle of journalists and scholars who has been following and writing about Afghanistan since the Soviet invasion days.  One of them is Edward Girardet, whose current book, Killing the Cranes:  A Reporter’s Journey through Three Decades of War in Afghanistan, offers personal accounts and commentaries about his encounters with Ahmed Shah Massoud, Gulbuddin Hekmetyar, and even Osama bin Laden.  Ed was a co-panelist with me at a 9/11 tenth anniversary talk we participated in at the University of Maine School of Law last year.  His talk was absolutely captivating, and I have a hard time putting down his book.

I like to consider myself as part of this circle, as I have also closely followed Afghanistan since the Soviet invasion.  Since 9/11 and the US campaign that toppled the Taliban regime, the US and ISAF (International Security Assistance Force) have come face-to-face with the complexities of the region.  If only the book Charlie Wilson’s War (2004) had been published sooner!  But, still, I doubt zealous policy makers on all sides would really appreciate or comprehend the complicatedness of the situation in Afghanistan, since diverse factors of the equations pertaining to each and every aspect of the situational factors are rarely considered, not to mention the often imprecise metrics in measuring the effectiveness of policies and strategies help put a more positive spin on the efforts and achievements of the coalition forces.  This is not to say that there are absolutely no positive results at all, but in light of a 2014 drawdown, this political analyst cannot help but be cynical.

For instance, much of Afghanistan’s economy relies on drug production and trafficking, as well as an intricate network of organized criminal activities involving warlords, gangsters, and a variety of opportunists, black marketers, and middlemen.  Check out this November 3, 2010 Time Magazine article (excerpts) describing only one aspect of Afghanistan’s black market economy:

“Popularly known as the ‘Bush Market’ and, increasingly, the ‘Obama Market’ the warren of small shops is the largest of several commercial centers named after U.S. Presidents that have sprung up since the fall of the Taliban in 2001. Indeed, the presence of foreign armies in the country has for many years spawned a supply and demand for their homegrown products. Three decades ago, during the Soviet occupation, its forerunner was called the ‘Brezhnev Market’ after the former head of the Communist Party, and its stalls were packed with basic Russian commodities. Now, 10 years into an American-led war, hard-to-find Western items are the top draw. ‘I come here all the time for new clothes,’ says Ajmal, 27, as he browses a selection of North Face trekking shoes. ‘The styles are good, the prices are low. It’s great’ …


At the Bagram market, bulletproof vests and Kevlar helmets are known to turn up. U.S. Army and Marine digital-camouflage fatigues are widely available for about $40 a set. And at another market near the capital’s largest mosque, Afghan police, army and even presidential guard uniforms sell for even less. (It’s not unheard of for Taliban suicide bombers disguised as Afghan security forces to infiltrate and attack large gatherings.) Yet shopkeeper Khwaja Muhammad, 23, concedes that although many of the customers are state military employees who go to buy a second uniform or have alterations done, ‘We sell to anybody with cash’.”


This is just one small glimpse into a spider-web network of the underground economy in Afghanistan, often linked to counterparts in Pakistan.  Ed’s book drives home the point:  if only we paid attention to certain caveats.

I contend that in order for a viable, legitimate economy to flourish, Afghanistan needs to empower an independent and impartial judiciary, which would presumably prosecute the lawbreakers, including those in the organized crime networks.  Some people argue with me that a viable Afghan judiciary is simply not possible, and even that it’s not the answer to Afghanistan’s problems.  It might not be the answer, but it better be part of the equation.

NOTE:  Everything I write in this blog constitutes my personal opinions and views.

Legitimizing the Taliban

3 01 2012

“American officials have said in recent months that the opening of a Taliban mission would be the single biggest step forward for peace efforts that have been plagued by false starts.”  This is a quote in today’s New York Times in an article entitled, “Taliban to Open Qatar Office in Step to Formal Talks.”  Pundits are viewing this as a prime opportunity and venue to hold “peace talks” with the Afghan Taliban.  However, I see something different:  (1) the post-9/11 war effort that toppled the Taliban from power, ten years later, only seems to revert back to negotiations with the very same enemy to share power after the US / ISAF pull-out in 2014; and (2) this “mission” is a means for backdoor legitimacy for the Taliban (although we know that they are not one monolithic entity – the top echelons under Mullah Omar will likely benefit most).

This is a very dangerous precedent, because it symbolizes what I call the calcification of the mind.  The Taliban are the enemies of knowledge.  Their empowerment, or return to empowerment, even if it’s limited, does not bode well for the future of Afghanistan, which, in my view, will fall back to square one.  No doubt, some Taliban are already congratulating themselves for their “victory” in gaining even an ounce of legitimacy, just by virtue of being recognized as an entity with which presumably peace talks can happen.  Once again, no one is thinking about the ideological and developmental disaster this portends for the Af-Pak region.

Consider this:  In Quil Lawrence’s NPR report (September 8, 2011), he interviewed a member of the Afghan Parliament who was also in the Northern Alliance, now a school principal.  Here is what Jaleb Mubin Zarifi, an ethnic Tajik, said in the interview:  “Democracy is un-Islamic,” and he praised the laws of the Taliban, saying, “The laws that they [Taliban] implemented – a good example, for instance, is about women – they asked all women to wear hijab (headscarf), and that’s a good thing.  And we know now that the women are not wearing hijab, and look what’s happening:  there’s cancer and AIDS everywhere now in Afghanistan.”  This was a Northern Alliance guy, not even Taliban.  Add the Taliban into the mix, and brace for the 21st century Inquisition.  Militant ideologies will have a field day.

This is not to say that a viable resolution should not be pursued in Afghanistan.  However, this rush to bring the Taliban to the negotiating table, and even opening a mission office for them in Qatar smacks of desperation to plug all the holes before pulling out of Afghanistan, out of fear that President Karzai’s house of cards might collapse, perhaps from the force of Taliban laughter in the wind.

NOTE:  Everything I write in this blog constitutes my personal opinions and views.